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CURBING THEIR ENTHUSIASM: A PROPOSAL TO
REGULATE OFFENSIVE SPEECH AT PUBLIC
UNIVERSITY BASKETBALL GAMES
Gregory Matthew Jacobs'
It is the biggest basketball game of the year. Your alma mater is
playing its most hated rival for first place. As the game approaches, your
mind drifts back to when you were a student. You remember the
excitement of past victories, the anguish of defeat, and the relationships
formed over the common thread of school spirit. This is the essence of
your school's tradition manifested in a single, two-hour event known as
the rivalry game. What better way to spend a Saturday afternoon with
your two grandsons than to introduce them to feelings of pride and
tradition embodied in a game.
As the game's intensity heats up, the student section, usually the role
model for school spirit, gets carried away. Instead of focusing on the
court, your grandsons are fixated on the expletive-filled cheers echoing
throughout the arena. Fearful that such a display will encourage profane
behavior by your grandsons, you feel obligated to leave the game early.
In fact, you cannot even listen to the game on the drive home, as the
same profane language would echo throughout the backseat of your car.
Instead of sharing some of the most memorable experiences of your
youth with your grandsons, Saturday afternoon has turned into an
exercise in child rearing. Rather than discussing the tradition of the
school you love so dearly, you are left to explain why the students'
actions are inappropriate and irresponsible.
If you went to the University of Maryland, this is the dilemma you
might well face in deciding whether to attend the school's basketball
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games.' Due to an incident in January 2004,2 the University of Maryland
has been thrust into the spotlight of an issue that is sweeping across
public universities nationwide:3 What can (and should) be done in
response to rabid cheering sections that push the limit of common
decency?
The University turned to the Maryland Attorney General's Office for
answers.4 In response to the University's request, John K. Anderson, an
assistant attorney general for the state of Maryland, issued a four-page
memorandum.' Anderson concluded that "the University may
constitutionally adopt a carefully drafted policy that prohibits offensive
speech at" the University's arena.6 The rationale underlying Anderson's
conclusion was his belief that it would be unreasonable to leave the
University with no remedy for "a phenomenon that has proved to be
upsetting to large numbers of fans.",7 However, Anderson suggested that
the University consider the practical problems associated with such a
regulation before deciding to adopt a policy regulating offensive speech.8
1. See Molly Knight, University of Maryland Sports Fans Urged To Clean Up
Behavior, BALT. SUN, May 4, 2004, at 1A (chronicling an incident at the University where
a man left a basketball game early due to profane student cheers). Clifford Kendall, the
Chairman of the Board of Regents at the University of Maryland, referred to the fans'
behavior as "simply atrocious" and "just sad" at a game he was forced to leave early to
prevent his two grandchildren from being exposed to profanity. Id.
2. See Barry Svrluga & Craig Whitlock, Pro-Terps and Profane: U-Md. Officials
Seek Legal Guidance on How To Deal with Vulgar Fans, WASH. POST, Jan. 30, 2004, at
Dll (describing an incident where student fans chanted profanities at an opposing player
during the waning seconds of a nationally televised game).
3. See Knight, supra note 1 (referring to the University of Maryland as "center court
in a national debate over how to limit rowdy fans without violating free speech"); cf
Howard M. Wasserman, Cheers, Profanity, and Free Speech, 31 J.C. & U.L. 377, 377 (2005)
(mentioning the incident at the University of Maryland as "one of many incidents of
offensive or obnoxious cheering by students throughout the country during the 2004
college basketball season"); Erik Brady, Big Ten's Last Resort on Taunting: Disbanding
Student Sections, USA TODAY, Feb. 6, 2004, at A5 (quoting the Big Ten Commissioner
who admitted being "aware that the use of obscenities at games is a big issue in certain
places" and remarked that "[n]o one feels good about it").
4. See Svrluga & Whitlock, supra note 2.
5. See Memorandum from the State of Maryland Office of the Attorney General to
the University of Maryland President C. D. Mote, Jr. (Mar. 17, 2004), http://www.oag.
state.md.us/Topics/offensivespeech.pdf [hereinafter Memorandum].
6. Id. at 1.
7. Id. at 4.
8. Id. Among the factors that Anderson suggested the University should weigh in
its decision are the danger that the regulation fails as overbroad or vague, the degree to
which fans are put on notice of what is prohibited, the practicality of creating a mechanism
for challenging a sanction under the policy, and the employee training required in order to
ensure proper enforcement. Id. Others familiar with the controversy at the University of
Maryland agree that an official policy may not be the best solution. See Evan Millar,
Officials get OK To Draft Fan Behavior Guidelines, DIAMONDBACK (College Park, Md.),
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Having received favorable legal advice, the University has proposed to
take additional steps to deter inappropriate fan conduct in the wake of
the controversy. 9 Furthermore, a sixteen-member student task force
conducted a forum in the spring of 2004 to assist the University by
formulating suggestions on how the administration might curtail
inappropriate behavior at sporting events.'0 However, the University has
yet to adopt an official regulation banning certain cheers from its arena."
The Big Ten Conference, however, has chosen to regulate certain fan
conduct in hopes of improving fan sportsmanship. In 2003, the
Conference passed an initiative holding institutions responsible for
Mar. 29, 2004, at 1, available at http://www.diamondbackonline.com/News/Diamondback/
archives/2004/03/29/newsl.html (explaining that the co-president of the University's
American Civil Liberties Union chapter has warned the school that "going down this legal
road would be dangerous") [hereinafter Millar, Fan Behavior Guidelines]; Evan Millar,
Students Question Effectiveness of Possible Fan Behavior Policy, DIAMONDBACK (College
Park, Md.), Mar. 30, 2004, at 1, available at http:lwww.diamondbackonline.com/News/
Diamondback/archives/2004/03/30/news2.html (quoting the University of Maryland
Student Government Association athletics liaison as saying "[u]ltimately [we] want to get
[the crowd] to the level where it's self-policed") [hereinafter Millar, Students Question
Policy]. But see Incivility and Profanity at Athletic Events, Part 11, 2004 SYNFAX WKLY.
REP. 3226, 3227 (concluding that "coaches are more likely to call for better sportsmanship,
and fans are more likely to display it, if everyone understands that the more extreme
forms of poor sportsmanship are subject to legal sanction").
9. See Evan Millar, Fan Behavior Report Released, DIAMONDBACK (College Park,
Md.), Jun. 24, 2004, at 1, available at http://www.diamondbackonline.com/News/
Diamondback/archives2004/06124/news2.html (listing various recommendations proposed
by a student committee including opening a basketball practice to discuss sportsmanship,
issuing a newspaper with alternative cheers on game day, and holding a T-shirt exchange
program where students could turn in their indecent shirts for new ones); Rick Snider,
Maryland OKs Restrictions on Terps Vulgarity, WASH. TIMES, Mar. 26, 2004, at Al
(discussing a courtside chat by the basketball coach and a pregame video discouraging
vulgar language used for the six home games following the incident). The associate
athletic director has also expressed his intent to take additional measures by referring to
the Maryland Attorney General's Memorandum as "encouraging because it allows us to
take additional steps." Id.
10. See Knight, supra note 1; Evan Millar, Williams To Join Other Top Terp Coaches
at Fan Behavior Forum, DIAMONDBACK (College Park, Md.), Apr. 29, 2004, at 1,
available at http://www.diamondbackonline.com/News/Diamondback/archives/2004/04/29/
news6.html. Among the prominent figures that spoke at the forum were the head coaches
of the University's football and basketball teams, the Chairman of the Board of Regents
for the University, the President of the Student Government Association, and a
representative of ESPN. Knight, supra note 1.
11. See Millar, Fan Behavior Guidelines, supra note 8 (explaining that the University
still needs to consider whether to implement an official policy in light of other avenues
available to curtail fan behavior). The University is fearful of student backlash from an
official speech code and would much prefer the student body to self-police. See Millar,
Students Question Policy, supra note 8.
12. See Press Release, Big Ten Conference, Big Ten Conference Enacts Crowd
Control Initiatives (Aug. 14, 2003) (on file with author) [hereinafter Press Release].
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"school sponsored student sections that attack or single out student-
athletes."' 3 Enforcement of the initiative is known as the three-strike
system.' 4 The first time a school's student section violates the initiative
the school receives a private warning. 15 The second violation results in a
public warning. 6 Finally, a third violation requires the school to disband
the student section altogether.'7  In defending the initiative, the
Commissioner of the Big Ten Conference asserts that regulating certain
fan conduct is "not a free speech issue" and that "[n]o one has a
constitutional right to attend a basketball game."' 8
Considering that the regulation of student cheers at basketball games
concerns a variety of parties' interests (the students' right to freedom of
expression, the patrons' right to enjoy the game free from undesired
exposure to vulgarity, the parent's right to prevent his or her child from
exposure to offensive conduct, and the University's fiscal and public
image concerns), the legal issue should continue to receive increased
attention as long as scholars disagree as to what measures may be taken
without violating the First Amendment. 9  Regardless of whether
resorting to regulatory sanctions is the preferred way of deterring
offensive conduct at public sporting events," the underlying issue of
whether a public university may constitutionally regulate expressive fan
conduct at an on-campus sporting event needs to be addressed.
2
'
This Comment evaluates a public university's ability to regulate
offensive cheers used by those attending on-campus basketball games in
13. Id.
14. See Brady, supra note 3.
15. Id.
16. Id.
17. Id. The Big Ten Commissioner confirmed that several schools have been warned
privately. Id.
18. Id.
19. Compare Memorandum, supra note 5, at 1 ("[T]he University may
constitutionally adopt a carefully drafted policy that prohibits offensive speech .... "), and
Incivility and Profanity at Athletic Events, supra note 8, at 3226 ("It's our view that campus
officials have latitude to develop reasonable regulations that limit disruptive conduct at
sports facilities .... "), with Wasserman, supra note 3, at 391 ("[A] state university may not
formally punish-even via non-criminal sanction such as removal from the arena-those
students who depart from generally accepted norms ... .
20. Seesupra note 11.
21. Recent concern over fan behavior at university sporting events is well-
documented. See Marc Fisher, Lewd, Crude and in Need of Rules, WASH. POST, Apr. 25,
2004, at C1 (commenting that the University of Maryland has "a responsibility to tell
students that certain behavior is not okay in certain places at certain times"); Knight,
supra note 1 (documenting that the University of Maryland has lost football recruits and
could potentially lose television revenue as a result of inappropriate fan conduct); cf
Laura Vecsey, When Sport Is Sullied by Vulgarity, We All Lose, BALT. SUN, Feb. 3, 2004,
at El (saying that fans need a reality check).
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light of the First Amendment. This Comment first chronicles the
Supreme Court's definition of what constitutes "speech" under the First
Amendment. Next, this Comment examines the Supreme Court's
decision in Cohen v. California22 and explains when the government may
regulate offensive speech. Then, this Comment discusses case law
subsequent to the Cohen decision involving the captive audience
doctrine. This Comment next analyzes the ability of a public university
to regulate the speech of those attending campus sporting events in light
of Supreme Court precedent. Finally, this Comment proposes a model
regulation that would pass First Amendment scrutiny as a proper method
of protecting individual privacy interests from offensive speech at
basketball games.
I. WHAT CONSTITUTES SPEECH: WHEN FIRST AMENDMENT SCRUTINY
WOULD APPLY TO A PUBLIC UNIVERSITY REGULATION
The First Amendment expressly provides that "Congress shall make
no law ... abridging the freedom of speech., 23 It is well accepted that
public universities are acting "under color of state law" and therefore
may not infringe upon a citizen's First Amendment rights without
violating the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment.24
Therefore, the threshold determination is whether the cheers that the
public universities seek to regulate constitute speech under First
Amendment case law.25
26In Spence v. Washington, the Supreme Court promulgated a test for
determining when First Amendment scrutiny is applicable.27 In Spence,
22. 403 U.S. 15 (1971).
23. U.S. CONST. amend. I.
24. See NCAA v. Tarkanian, 488 U.S. 179, 191-93 (1988) (establishing that "[a] state
university without question is a state actor"); Lee Ann Rabe, Case Note, Sticks and Stones:
The First Amendment and Campus Speech Codes, 37 J. MARSHALL L. REV. 205, 206 n.3
(2003). Private universities are not engaged in state action and therefore normally would
not owe duties arising from the Constitution not to interfere with free speech. See Shelley
v. Kraemer, 334 U.S. 1, 13 (1948) ("[T]he principle has become firmly embedded in our
constitutional law that the action inhibited by... the Fourteenth Amendment is only such
action as may fairly be said to be that of the States. That Amendment erects no shield
against merely private conduct, however discriminatory or wrongful."); Rabe, supra, at
206 n.3.
25. See Incivility and Profanity at Athletic Events, supra note 8, at 3226 (expressing
the fact that the Court distinguishes between "expression" and "conduct" and that
"campus officials have latitude to develop reasonable regulations that limit disruptive
conduct at sports facilities, even if such conduct has expressive elements"); Memorandum,
supra note 5, at I n.2 (noting that the University has an "argument that [the cheers are]
better regarded as conduct outside the scope of First Amendment protection").
26. 418 U.S. 405 (1974).
27. Id. at 410-11.
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the Supreme Court found that a person flying a United States flag
bearing a peace sign was participating in conduct protected by the First
Amendment because "[a]n intent to convey a particularized message was
present, and in the surrounding circumstances the likelihood was great
that the message would be understood by those who viewed it."'28 The
Court has allowed regulation of conduct that has incidental limitations
on First Amendment freedoms when the government's interest is focused
on the noncommunicative aspects of the conduct. 9 However, the Court
will not apply the lower level of scrutiny when the connection between
the government's interest and the conduct regulated "depend[s] on the
likely communicative impact of [the] expressive conduct."30 Therefore,
as long as the regulation focuses on the communicative impact of
expressive conduct, the Court will apply heightened First Amendment
scrutiny.31
28. Id.; see also Tinker v. Des Moines Indep. Cmty. Sch. Dist., 393 U.S. 503, 505-06
(1969) (finding that students wearing black armbands in school to protest a war was
expressive conduct protected by the First Amendment); cf. Clark v. Cmty. for Creative
Non-Violence, 468 U.S. 288, 293 (1984) (accepting, but not expressly agreeing with, a
lower court's finding that a group of people sleeping in a park overnight to manifest the
plight of the homeless was expressive conduct protected by the First Amendment).
Scholars commonly recognize the language in Spence as the test used to determine
whether First Amendment analysis is pertinent. See, e.g., ERWIN CHEMERINSKY,
CONSTITUTIONAL LAW § 11.3.6.1, at 1026-28 (2d ed. 2002).
29. See Clark, 468 U.S. at 293; City Council v. Taxpayers for Vincent, 466 U.S. 789,
804-05 (1984); Heffron v. Int'l Soc'y for Krishna Consciousness, Inc., 452 U.S. 640, 647-48
(1981); United States v. O'Brien, 391 U.S. 367, 376 (1968); CHEMERINSKY, supra note 28,
§ 11.3.6.2, at 1028-32.
30. Texas v. Johnson, 491 U.S. 397, 411 (1989); see also Boos v. Barry, 485 U.S. 312,
319-21 (1988) (plurality opinion); Consol. Edison Co. v. Pub. Serv. Comm'n, 447 U.S. 530,
536-38 (1980); Police Dep't v. Mosley, 408 U.S. 92, 95-96 (1972). The Court in Johnson
found that a statute imposing criminal sanctions for desecrating the American flag
suppressed free expression and was thereby subjected to heightened scrutiny, explaining
that "[i]f there is a bedrock principle underlying the First Amendment, it is that the
government may not prohibit the expression of an idea simply because society finds the
idea itself offensive or disagreeable." Johnson, 491 U.S. at 414.
31. See supra notes 26-30 and accompanying text. However, some scholars believe
that the line between content-based and content-neutral regulations is not as clear as the
Court makes it out to be. See, e.g., Wilson R. Huhn, Assessing the Constitutionality of
Laws That Are Both Content-Based and Content-Neutral: The Emerging Constitutional
Calculus, 79 IND. L.J. 801, 814-27 (2004); Martin H. Redish, The Content Distinction in
First Amendment Analysis, 34 STAN. L. REV. 113, 142-50 (1981). For a summary of the
case law involving communicative conduct, see CHEMERINSKY, supra note 28, § 11.3.6.2,
at 1028-32.
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II. THE LIMITATION ON "OFFENSIVE SPEECH": THE PLIGHT OF THE
UNWILLING LISTENER
Although the First Amendment provides broad protection for the
expression of ideas, it has never been interpreted as an absolute bar to
speech regulation.32 The Court has articulated that:
"There are certain well-defined and narrowly limited classes of
speech, the prevention and punishment of which have never
been thought to raise any Constitutional problem. These
include the lewd and obscene, the profane, the libelous, and the
insulting or 'fighting' words . . . . [S]uch utterances are no
essential part of any exposition of ideas, and are of such slight
social value as a step to truth that any benefit that may be
derived from them is clearly outweighed by the social interest in
order and morality."33
The Court has not placed vulgar and offensive language among the
categories of speech undeserving of First Amendment protection.34
However, it has used similar language in explaining that "[b]ecause
content of [vulgar, offensive, and shocking speech] is not entitled to
absolute constitutional protection under all circumstances, we must
consider its context in order to determine whether the [regulatory] action
[is] constitutionally permissible."35 Therefore, while any regulation of
32. See Beauharnais v. Illinois, 343 U.S. 250, 255-57 (1952). However, one Justice has
interpreted the First Amendment as an absolute bar to speech regulation. See Konigsberg
v. State Bar of Cal., 366 U.S. 36, 61 (1961) (Black, J., dissenting). Justice Black "d[id] not
subscribe to [the idea that certain classes of speech are not protected by the First
Amendment] for [he] believe[d] that the First Amendment's unequivocal command that
there shall be no abridgement of the rights of free speech and assembly shows that the
men who drafted our Bill of Rights did all the 'balancing' that was to be done in this field."
Id. For a summary of Justice Black's interpretation of the First Amendment, see generally
Edmond Cahn, Justice Black and First Amendment "Absolutes": A Public Interview, 37
N.Y.U. L. REV. 549 (1962) and Sylvia Snowiss, The Legacy of Justice Black, 1973 SUP. CT.
REV. 187, 227-37 (1973).
33. Beauharnais, 343 U.S. at 255-57 (quoting Chaplinsky v. New Hampshire, 315 U.S.
568, 571-72 (1942)).
34. See, e.g., FCC v. Pacifica Found., 438 U.S. 726, 747-48 (1978) (plurality opinion)
(concluding that public broadcasts of sexually explicit language do not fall under any
category not protected by the First Amendment); Hess v. Indiana, 414 U.S. 105, 106-07
(1973) (finding that an antiwar protester telling a police officer that "[w]e'll take the
fucking street later" was speech protected by the First Amendment); Cohen v. California,
403 U.S. 15, 16, 20 (1971) (finding that the First Amendment protected a man walking into
a courthouse with a jacket displaying the phrase "Fuck the Draft" from criminal
prosecution).
35. Pacifica, 438 U.S. at 747-48 (plurality opinion).
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offensive speech will receive strict scrutiny,36 the First Amendment does
allow offensive speech to be regulated under certain circumstances.
The Court explained the government's right to regulate offensive
speech in the landmark case Cohen v. California.7 In this case, a man
wearing a jacket bearing the words "Fuck the Draft" entered a California
courthouse. He was convicted of violating a section of the California
Penal Code that prohibited "maliciously and willfully disturb[ing] the
peace or quiet of any neighborhood or person . .. by . . .offensive
conduct."39  The Court of Appeal of California upheld the man's
conviction and sentence of thirty days in prison by defining his offensive
conduct as "behavior which has a tendency to provoke others to acts of
violence or to in turn disturb the peace., 40  The Court of Appeal
concluded that "on the facts of this case, '[i]t was certainly reasonably
foreseeable that such conduct might cause others to rise up to commit a
violent act against the person of the defendant or attempt to forceably
[sic] remove his jacket."' 4
The Supreme Court reversed Cohen's conviction. 4  After quickly
establishing that the regulation involved the content of speech,43 the
Court found that Cohen's conviction could not be justified under the
fighting words doctrine because his statement was not directed towards
any person in particular, and that nobody could have reasonably
36. See Hess, 414 U.S. at 107-08 (explaining that Hess' conviction could only be
upheld if his offensive language passed the strict scrutiny test adopted in Brandenburg v.
Ohio, 395 U.S. 444, 447 (1969)). However, not all scholars agree that the Court has been
consistent in requiring all content-based restrictions on protected speech to be narrowly
tailored to serve a compelling state interest. See, e.g., Eugene Volokh, Freedom of Speech,
Permissible Tailoring and Transcending Strict Scrutiny, 144 U. PA. L. REV. 2417, 2417
(1996). After reviewing the Court's history of applying strict scrutiny, Volokh concludes
that "some content-based speech restrictions are unconstitutional even though they are
narrowly tailored to a compelling state interest." Id. at 2460. Volokh proposes that the
Court abandon the strict scrutiny analysis in favor of applying "categorical rules and
categorical exceptions." Id.
37. 403 U.S. 15 (1971).
38. Id. at 16-17.
39. Id. at 16.
40. Id. at 17.
41. Id. (alteration in original) (quoting People v. Cohen, 81 Cal. Rptr. 503, 506 (Ct.
App. 1969)). From this analysis, the Court of Appeal of California seemed to place the
statute within the "fighting words" doctrine, which the Supreme Court has recognized as
speech falling outside of the protection of the First Amendment. See Chaplinsky v. New
Hampshire, 315 U.S. 568, 573 (1942) (defining the "fighting words" doctrine as those
words "plainly tending to excite the addressee to a breach of the peace").
42. Cohen, 403 U.S. at 26.
43. Id. at 18 (asserting that the conviction "quite clearly rests upon the asserted
offensiveness of the words Cohen used to convey his message to the public" and not on
"separately identifiable conduct").
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interpreted the statement as a direct, personal insult." Therefore, the
Court concluded that Cohen's speech did not fall within any category of
speech unprotected by the First Amendment.45
In particular, the Court discussed why Cohen's speech was protected
even though it was addressed to an unwilling listener.46  While
recognizing that one is sometimes captive in public and subject to
offensive speech, the Court concluded that "[t]he ability of government,
consonant with the Constitution, to shut off discourse solely to protect
others from hearing it is ... dependent upon a showing that substantial
privacy interests are being invaded in an essentially intolerable
manner." 47 In explaining the reversal of Cohen's conviction, the Court
emphasized that the "portion of the statute upon which Cohen's
conviction rests evinces no concern . . . with the special plight of the
captive auditor., 48 Due to this explanation, the principle has since been
labeled the "captive audience doctrine.
49
In applying this test to the facts of Cohen, the Court provided valuable
insight into the captive audience doctrine. 0 The Court classified the
unwilling listeners present at the courthouse as having "a more
44. Id. at 20. The Court also pointed out that Cohen's words could not be justified as
obscene expression because "such expression must be, in some significant way, erotic." Id.
The Court defines obscenity as works that depict or describe sexual conduct "which, taken
as a whole, appeal to the prurient interest in sex [in a] patently offensive way, and ... do
not have any serious literary, artistic, political, or scientific value." Miller v. California,
413 U.S. 15, 24 (1973); see also infra note 151.
45. Cohen, 403 U.S. at 19-20 ("[Tjhis case cannot be said to fall within those relatively
few categories of instances where prior decisions have established the power of
government to deal more comprehensively with certain forms of individual expression
simply upon a showing that such a form was employed.").
46. Id. at 21.
47. Id. This has become the standard by which the government may regulate
offensive speech without offending the First Amendment. See Consol. Edison Co. of N.Y.
v. Pub. Serv. Comm'n, 447 U.S. 530, 541 (1980); FCC v. Pacifica Found., 438 U.S. 726, 764
(1978) (Brennan, J., dissenting); Erznoznik v. City of Jacksonville, 422 U.S. 205, 209-11
(1975); Hess v. Indiana, 414 U.S. 105, 108 (1973); 16A AM. JUR. 2D Constitutional Law §
475 (1998); 1 RODNEY A. SMOLLA, SMOLLA AND NIMMER ON FREEDOM OF SPEECH §
5:3 (2004).
48. Cohen, 403 U.S. at 22.
49. See, e.g., Edward J. Eberle, Hate Speech, Offensive Speech, and Public Discourse
in America, 29 WAKE FOREST L. REV. 1135, 1190 (1994) (referencing the Cohen test as
the captive audience doctrine); Marcy Strauss, Redefining the Captive Audience Doctrine,
19 HASTINGS CONST. L.Q. 85, 85 (1991) ("The concept that the government may regulate
speech delivered to an unwilling listener is usually referred to as the 'captive audience
doctrine."'); Michael R. Sullivan, Annual Survey of South Carolina Law, Court Finds No
First Amendment Conflict in Ban on 'Loud and Unseemly' Speech, 46 S.C. L. REV. 22, 27
(1994) (labeling the Cohen opinion as "one of the Supreme Court's few majority
discussions of the captive audience principle").
50. Cohen, 403 U.S. at 21-26.
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substantial claim to a recognizable privacy interest" than when "strolling
through Central Park," but did not equate the interest to that of the
privacy of one's home.51 However, the Court emphasized that the
privacy interest of the unwilling listener does not absolutely defeat the
speaker's First Amendment right.52  Ultimately, the Court concluded
that:
Given the subtlety and complexity of the factors involved, if
Cohen's "speech" was otherwise entitled to constitutional
protection, we do not think the fact that some unwilling
"listeners" in a public building may have been briefly exposed
to it can serve to justify this breach of the peace conviction
where, as here, there was no evidence that persons powerless to
avoid appellant's conduct did in fact object to it, and where that
portion of the statute upon which Cohen's conviction rests
evinces no concern, either on its face or as construed by the
California courts, with the special plight of the captive auditor,
but, instead, indiscriminately sweeps within its prohibitions all
"offensive conduct" that disturbs "any neighborhood or
person. ' 3
For these reasons, along with the unwilling listeners' ability to avoid the
message by simply "averting their eyes, 54 the Court found that Cohen's
51. Id. at 21-22.
52. Id. at 21. The Court recognized that "Cohen's distasteful mode of expression was
thrust upon unwilling or unsuspecting viewers," but explained that "the mere presumed
presence of unwitting listeners or viewers does not serve automatically to justify curtailing
all speech capable of giving offense." Id. Turning to the facts of the case, the Court
contrasted the unwilling listeners in the California courthouse with those "subjected to the
raucous emissions of sound trucks blaring outside their residences." Id. This was a
reference to Kovacs v. Cooper, 336 U.S. 77 (1949), a case where the Court found an
ordinance barring sound trucks from broadcasting in a loud and raucous manner on the
streets consistent with the First Amendment. Id. at 89 (plurality opinion). In Kovacs,
Justice Reed reasoned that "[t]he right of free speech is guaranteed every citizen that he
may reach the minds of willing listeners and to do so there must be opportunity to win
their attention," thus implying that the listener must have an ability to avoid unwanted
communication (in order for the speaker to "lose" their attention). Id. at 87. In
distinguishing Cohen from Kovacs, the Cohen Court concluded that "[t]hose in the Los
Angeles courthouse could effectively avoid further bombardment of their sensibilities
simply by averting their eyes." Cohen, 403 U.S. at 21.
53. Cohen, 403 U.S. at 22.
54. Id. at 21. Cases subsequent to Cohen illustrate the importance of this factor. See,
e.g., Bolger v. Youngs Drug Prods. Corp., 463 U.S. 60, 72 (1983) (concluding that a
homeowner is not captive to unsolicited mail because "[riecipients of objectionable
mailings ... may 'effectively avoid further bombardment of their sensibilities simply by
averting their eyes .... (quoting Cohen, 403 U.S. at 21)); Consol. Edison Co. of N.Y. v.
Pub. Serv. Comm'n, 447 U.S. 530, 542 (1980) (reiterating that one is not captive in the
home from unwanted mail by using the "avert your eyes" language from Cohen);
Erznoznik v. City of Jacksonville, 422 U.S. 205, 212 (1975) (invalidating an ordinance
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conviction violated his constitutional right to free expression."
Therefore, although the Cohen case hinted that the government may
regulate offensive conduct under certain circumstances,56 it has left a gray
area in the law as to when that action may be exercised consistent with
the First Amendment.57
III. THE EVOLUTION OF THE CAPTIVE AUDIENCE: WHEN AND WHERE
THE GOVERNMENT MAY REGULATE OFFENSIVE SPEECH To PROTECT
THE PRIVACY OF THE UNWILLING LISTENER
A. The Right to Privacy at Home
Case law subsequent to Cohen involving the privacy of the home has
provided valuable insight into how the captive audience doctrine should
be applied. One such situation in which these privacy interests are
58 5implicated is public radio broadcasts. In FCC v. Pacifica Foundation,9
the dispute before the Court focused on whether the FCC had a right to
impose sanctions against Pacifica Foundation for broadcasting an
indecent, but not obscene, message across public airways during the
daytime.6° After assuming that the First Amendment normally would
61protect the speech in question, the Court reiterated that "we must
consider [the speech's] context in order to determine whether the
Commission's action was constitutionally permissible.,
62
because "the offended viewer readily can avert his eyes" from a drive-in movie screen);
Spence v. Washington, 418 U.S. 405, 412 (1974) (finding that people passing by a flag on
the street were not a captive audience because "[a]nyone who might have been offended
could easily have avoided the display").
55. See Cohen, 403 U.S. at 26.
56. See id. at 21; see also 16A AM. JUR. 2D Constitutional Law § 475 (1998) (using the
language from Cohen in explaining when the government may shut off discourse to
protect the listener); LAURENCE H. TRIBE, AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW § 12-19,
at 948-49 (2d. ed. 1988) (citing Cohen to explain when a state actor can restrict offensive
speech without violating the First Amendment).
57. See William S. Cohen, A Look Back at Cohen v. California, 34 UCLA L. REV.
1595, 1602-04 (1987) (discussing the ambiguity of the Cohen opinion) (author not related
to the plaintiff); Franklyn S. Haiman, Speech v. Privacy: Is There a Right Not To Be
Spoken To?, 67 Nw. U. L. REV. 153, 193 (1972) (explaining that the Cohen test "is of little
utility unless the phrases 'substantial privacy interests' and 'essentially intolerable manner'
are defined"); Strauss, supra note 49, at 86 (commenting that the captive audience
doctrine "has become a slogan without substance"). For an interesting summary of Cohen
v. California, see Ronald J. Krotoszynski, Jr., Cohen v. California: "Inconsequential" Cases
and Larger Principles, 74 TEX. L. REV. 1251, 1252-56 (1996).
58. See infra notes 59-67 and accompanying text.
59. 438 U.S. 726 (1978).
60. Id. at 729-31.
61. Id. at 746 (plurality opinion).
62. Id. at 747-48.
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The Court upheld the FCC sanctions, emphasizing that "the airwaves
confront[] the citizen, not only in public, but also in the privacy of the
home, where the individual's right to be left alone plainly outweighs the
First Amendment rights of an intruder. 6 3 In distinguishing Pacifica from
Cohen, the Court explained that "broadcasting is uniquely accessible to
children" and the broadcast in question "could have enlarged a child's
vocabulary in an instant." 64 The Court also distinguished the case from
Cohen by stressing that Pacifica did not involve or justify a criminal
prosecution for violating the regulation.6 5 The concurrence agreed with
the majority's reasoning that the "result turns . . . on the unique
characteristics of the broadcast media, combined with society's right to
protect its children from speech generally agreed to be inappropriate for
their years, and with the interest of unwilling adults in not being
assaulted by such offensive speech in their homes., 66  In conclusion,
Pacifica reiterates the Court's recognition of the government's ability to
regulate speech otherwise protected by the First Amendment in order to
67
safeguard the privacy rights of its citizens.
However, the Court has not yet perceived the privacy of the home as
an absolute bar to all unwanted messages. 68 In Bolger v. Youngs Drug
69Products Corp., the Court found a statute that prohibited the mailing of
63. Id. at 748 (majority opinion). The Court has recognized the state's interest in
protecting the privacy of the home as "certainly [one] of the highest order in a free and
civilized society" and that "[p~reserving the sanctity of the home ... is surely an important
value." Carey v. Brown, 447 U.S. 455, 471 (1980); see also SMOLLA, supra note 47, §§ 5:4-
:5 (discussing the importance the Court places on preserving the privacy of one's home).
64. Pacifica, 438 U.S. at 749.
65. Id. at 750.
66. Id. at 762 (Powell, J., concurring). Justice Powell did not sign on to Part IV-B of
Justice Stevens' opinion due to his belief that Justice Stevens had judged the value of the
speech, a conclusion that Powell believed was the right of each individual to make rather
than the Court. Id. at 761; cf Cohen, supra note 57, at 1608-09 (explaining that while
Pacifica "can ... be explained as [a] narrow, fact-specific holding[]" it is "[m]ore
significant ... for First Amendment theory in situations beyond the specific problem of
offensive and profane speech[ that Pacifica] contradict[s] some of the major premises of
Justice Harlan's opinion in Cohen").
67. Pacifica, 438 U.S. at 748-51; see also Denver Area Educ. Telecomm. Consortium,
Inc. v. FCC, 518 U.S. 727, 744-47 (1996) (plurality opinion) (upholding regulation of public
access cable channels as analogous to the regulation of public broadcasts in Pacifica);
Columbia Broad. Sys., Inc. v. Democratic Nat'l Comm., 412 U.S. 94, 127-28 (1973)
(discussing "the reality that in a very real sense listeners and viewers [of broadcast
materials] constitute a 'captive audience"').
68. See Strauss, supra note 49, at 91 ("At times, the Court has placed some obligation
even on persons within the home to reject the speech."); James J. Zych, Note, Hill v.
Colorado and the Evolving Rights of the Unwilling Listener, 45 ST. Louis U. L.J. 1281,
1294-95 (2001) (providing an excellent summary of how the Court addresses the rights of
the unwilling listener at home in the context of mail cases).
69. 463 U.S. 60 (1983).
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unsolicited contraceptive advertisements to private homes
unconstitutional.7 0 The Court reasoned that the unwilling listener could
simply avoid the message by averting his or her eyes." Similarly, in
Consolidated Edison Co. of New York v. Public Service Commission,72 an
order of the New York Public Service Commission suppressing inserts in
utility bills that involved controversial issues of public policy was found
to be unconstitutional. 73 The Court concluded that an unwilling listener
"may escape exposure to objectionable material simply by transferring
the bill insert from envelope to wastebasket., 74 These cases illustrate
that the Court places great weight on the listener's ability to avoid the
message, going so far as to say "[t]he First Amendment permits the
government to prohibit offensive speech as intrusive when the 'captive'
audience cannot avoid the objectionable speech., 75
70. Id. at 75. The exact language of the statute that Youngs Drug Products
Corporation violated prohibited "'[a]ny unsolicited advertisement of matter which is
designed, adapted, or intended for preventing conception is nonmailable matter ... shall
be disposed of as the Postal Service directs."' Id. at 61 (alteration in original). In addition
to civil liability, there was also a criminal statute that made it a crime to knowingly use the
mail in violation of the civil statute. Id. at 62.
71. Id. at 72 (citing Cohen v. California, 403 U.S. 15, 21 (1971)). In coming to this
conclusion, the Court compared Bolger to Rowan v. United States Post Office Dept., 397
U.S. 728 (1970), explaining that in Rowan the recipient of unwanted mail had to take
affirmative steps to put the mailer on notice that he or she no longer wished to receive the
mailer's materials. Bolger, 463 U.S. at 72. The Court distinguished Bolger by explaining
that "we have never held that the Government itself can shut off the flow of mailings to
protect those recipients who might potentially be offended." Id. In Bolger, the Court
found that the statute could not be justified as protecting a captive audience because the
unwilling listener could simply throw the message in the trash, which the Court concluded
was "'an acceptable burden, at least so far as the Constitution is concerned."' Id. (quoting
Lamont v. Comm'n of Motor Vehicles, 269 F. Supp. 880, 883 (S.D.N.Y. 1967)).
72. 447 U.S. 530 (1980).
73. Id. at 544. This conflict arose after the Consolidated Edison Company of New
York placed a bill insert inside their monthly billing statement advocating the use of
nuclear power. Id. at 532. In response, the Natural Resources Defense Council (NRDC)
petitioned the Public Service Commission of the State of New York to open Consolidated
Edison's billing envelopes in order for the NRDC to send out a rebuttal against the
positives of nuclear power. Id. The Commission denied NRDC's request and barred all
political bill inserts, concluding that the recipients constituted a captive audience who
could not have views on controversial topics forced upon them. Id. at 532-33.
Subsequently, Consolidated Edison sought judicial review of the Commission's order
barring future use of political bill inserts. Id. at 533.
74. Id. at 542. The Court used this quote to point out that the New York "Court of
Appeals erred in its assessment of the seriousness of the intrusion." Id. at 541.
75. Frisby v. Schultz, 487 U.S. 474, 487 (1988) (citing Consol. Edison Co., 447 U.S. at
542); compare id. (allowing the state to regulate protesters within a certain distance of
one's home because the "resident is ... trapped within the home, and ... is left with no
ready means of avoiding the unwanted speech"), and Rowan, 397 U.S. at 737-38
(upholding a regulation which prohibited solicitors from contacting certain households via
mail when the household has notified the mailer that he or she desired no further contact
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B. The Right to Privacy Outside the Home
The Court has also addressed the unwilling listener's right to avoid
offensive speech outside of the home.76 In Lehman v. City of Shaker
Heights," Justice Douglas, writing a concurring opinion, argued that an
unwilling listener on a public streetcar is considered a captive audience
and has a right "to be free from forced intrusions on [his or her]
,,78privacy. Since such an audience is unable to leave the premises to
avoid hearing the message, Justice Douglas concluded that the speaker
could not "force his message upon an audience incapable of declining to
receive it."7 9 In essence, the concurrence determined that the City of
Shaker Heights could prohibit political ads in order to protect the captive
audience's privacy interests.80 The majority opinion agreed with Justice
Douglas's assertion, at least in part, when it held that "the risk of
imposing upon a captive audience" was one factor that legitimized the
City's actions.8'
from the mailer), with Watchtower Bible & Tract Soc'y of N.Y., Inc. v. Village of Stratton,
536 U.S. 150, 168 (2002) (finding a state's regulation of door-to-door soliciting
unconstitutional because the unwilling listener could simply place a no solicitation sign in
his or her yard or refuse to engage in conversation with the solicitor), and Sable Commc'ns
of Cal., Inc. v. FCC, 492 U.S. 115, 127-28 (1989) (creating a blanket prohibition on
indecent interstate phone calls was found to be unconstitutional because services were
provided only after the listener took affirmative steps to receive the calls).
76. See, e.g., Hill v. Colorado, 530 U.S. 703 (2000) (patrons in vicinity of abortion
clinic); Madsen v. Women's Health Center, Inc., 512 U.S. 753 (1994) (patrons in vicinity of
abortion clinic); Bethel Sch. Dist. No. 403 v. Fraser, 478 U.S. 675 (1986) (audience of
student assembly); Heffron v. Int'l Soc'y for Krishna Consciousness, Inc., 452 U.S. 640
(1981) (patrons of public fair); Erznoznik v. City of Jacksonville, 422 U.S. 205 (1975)
(vicinity of drive-in movie theater); Se. Promotions, Ltd. v. Conrad, 420 U.S. 546 (1975)
(theatre audience); Spence v. Washington, 418 U.S. 405 (1974) (passersby of flag);
Lehman v. City of Shaker Heights, 418 U.S. 298 (1974) (patrons of public transportation).
77. 418 U.S. 298 (1974).
78. Id. at 307 (Douglas, J., concurring). The City of Shaker Heights had contracted
out the management of advertising space on the transit system to Metromedia on the
condition that Metromedia would not put up political advertising. Id. at 299-300. Harry J.
Lehman, a candidate for State Representative, petitioned Metromedia to place an ad on a
public streetcar on his behalf. Id. at 300. When Lehman's request was denied, he
petitioned for judicial relief. Id. at 301.
79. Id. at 307.
80. Id. ("In my view the right of the commuters to be free from forced intrusions on
their privacy precludes the city from transforming its vehicles of public transportation into
forums for the dissemination of ideas upon this captive audience.").
81. Id. at 304 (majority opinion). The disagreement between the majority and Justice
Douglas centered on the majority's discussion of commercial speech. See id. at 303-04.
The majority found that Shaker Heights' decision to allow commercial advertisements but
not political advertisements on the city transit system was a reasonable means of
increasing revenues and minimizing the risk of political favoritism. Id. at 304. Justice
Douglas did not rule on the validity of the commercial advertising program because it was
not at issue on appeal, but did voice his disagreement with the majority by saying that
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The Supreme Court came to a similar conclusion in Bethel School
District Number 403 v. Fraser.8 2 In Bethel, a student was punished for
using graphic language in a speech to high school students despite
warnings from his teachers that use of inappropriate language could
result in severe consequences. 8' After recognizing that the school had a
legitimate interest in protecting minors from exposure to offensive
language,'4 the Court concluded that the school could punish the speaker
for using offensive language towards an unsuspecting audience of
teenage students without violating the First Amendment. 5 The Court
went so far as to conclude that "it was perfectly appropriate for the
school to disassociate itself [with the speech] to make the point to the
pupils that vulgar speech and lewd conduct is wholly inconsistent with
the 'fundamental values' of public school education."
6
However, in Erznoznik v. City of Jacksonville,87 the Court came to the
opposite conclusion in evaluating the constitutionality of a city ordinance
that prohibited the showing of any movie containing nudity at a drive-in
18theater visible from a public street. The Court acknowledged a "limited
"[he] did] not view the content of the message as relevant" and that "[c]ommercial
advertisements may be as offensive and intrusive to captive audiences as any political
message." Id. at 308 (Douglas, J., concurring). Therefore, regardless of the disagreement
over commercial advertising, both Justice Douglas and the majority were in agreement
that passengers on a public streetcar would have been captive to Lehman's political
advertisement. See id. at 304 (majority opinion); id. at 308 (Douglas, J., concurring).
82. 478 U.S. 675, 685 (1986).
83. Id. at 677-78. Fraser, while delivering a speech nominating a student for elective
office, referred to the candidate "in terms of an elaborate, graphic, and explicit sexual
metaphor." Id. He was subsequently suspended from school for three days for
deliberately violating "Bethel High School['s] disciplinary rule prohibiting the use of
obscene language" in school. Id. at 678. The rule prohibited "'[c]onduct which materially
and substantially interferes with the educational process ... including the use of obscene,
profane language or gestures."' Id. Fraser appealed to federal court claiming a First
Amendment violation after having his suspension affirmed by a school official. Id. at 678-
79.
84. Id. at 684. The Court used the Pacifica opinion to justify its rationale, thus
indicating the Court's willingness to extend the interest in protecting children from
offensive language to contexts outside of the home. Id. at 684-85.
85. Id. at 685 ("The First Amendment does not prevent the school officials from
determining that to permit a vulgar and lewd speech such as respondent's would
undermine the school's basic educational mission.").
86. Id. at 685-86.
87. 422 U.S. 205 (1975).
88. See id. at 212. Richard Erznoznik, the manager of a drive-in movie theater, was
charged with violating Jacksonville's municipal code after displaying a motion picture
containing nudity that was visible from the street. Id. at 206. The code made it:
"unlawful ... for any ticket seller, ticket taker, usher, motion picture projection
machine operator, manager, owner, or any other person connected with or
employed by any drive-in theater in the City to exhibit, or aid or assist in
exhibiting, any motion picture, slide, or other exhibit in which the human male or
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privacy interest of persons on the public streets," but concluded that an
unwilling viewer could simply avert his or her eyes in order to avoid the
movie screen.89 Ultimately, because the unwilling listener on the street
could simply look away, the Court found that the movie theater's right to
engage in protected speech outweighed the viewer's privacy interests.90
Therefore, while some feel that the Court has properly limited the
captive audience doctrine to situations involving the privacy of the
home, 91 the case law demonstrates that the Court may be receptive to
legislation protecting the captive audience outside the home in certain
contexts.92
female bare buttocks, human female bare breasts, or human bare pubic areas are
shown, if such motion picture, slide, or other exhibit is visible from any public
street or public place."
Id. at 206-07. Erznoznik was able to successfully stay his prosecution and file a separate
declaratory action challenging the facial validity of the municipal code. Id. at 207.
89. Id. at 212.
90. See id. The ability of the unwilling listener to avoid the message is an important
factor in whether the Court will allow the government to regulate. See, e.g., Heffron v.
Int'l Soc'y for Krishna Consciousness, Inc., 452 U.S. 640, 657 & n.1 (1981) (Brennan, J.,
concurring in part and dissenting in part) (explaining that people attending a fair would
not be a captive audience to those issuing handouts because "fairgoers are fully capable of
saying 'no' to persons seeking their attention and then walking away"); Spence v.
Washington, 418 U.S. 405, 412 (1974) (concluding that "[a]nyone who might have been
offended [by an American flag with a peace sign attached] could easily have avoided the
display"); cf Hill v. Colorado, 530 U.S. 703, 715-19 & 718 n.25 (2000) (concluding that a
woman entering a health care clinic's interest in avoiding physical and emotional harm
suffered from an unwelcome message validates a regulation prohibiting one from
approaching a woman without consent within the vicinity of the clinic); Madsen v.
Women's Health Center, Inc., 512 U.S. 753, 781 (1994) (Stevens, J., concurring in part and
dissenting in part) (labeling women entering an abortion clinic as captive to protesters
who "follow and harass" them).
91. See Eugene Volokh, Freedom of Speech and Workplace Harassment, 39 UCLA L.
REV. 1791, 1833-38 (1992) (concluding that the Court has never upheld a content-based
restriction outside the home because it has properly limited the captive audience doctrine
to the home by comparing decisions involving the privacy of the home with decisions in
other contexts); cf Richard H. Fallon, Jr., Sexual Harassment, Content Neutrality, and the
First Amendment Dog That Didn't Bark, 1994 SUP. CT. REV. 1, 18 (explaining that the
captive audience cases establish that "the character of the place seems more important
than the degree of audience 'captivity' in explaining the applications of captive audience
doctrine"). However, Fallon does not agree with Volokh's assertion that the Court has
never used the captive audience doctrine to uphold a content-based regulation outside of
the home. Id. at 18 n.98. But see infra note 129 (making the argument that the captive
audience doctrine should focus on the degree of captivity of the unwilling listener rather
than the character of the place).
92. See supra text accompanying notes 76-91; see also Erznoznik, 422 U.S. at 209
(stating that the government should be allowed to regulate when "the degree of captivity
makes it impractical for the unwilling viewer or auditor to avoid exposure").
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C. Other Factors Influencing the Regulation of Offensive Speech
In overturning Cohen's conviction, the Court in Cohen highlighted
several other reasons why the California statute was not consistent with
the First Amendment.9 3 First, the Court emphasized that the statute
involved severe criminal ramifications.94 Second, there was no evidence
that anyone in the California courthouse actually expressed displeasure
with Cohen's jacket. 95  And finally, the Court concluded that the
California statute was overbroad and vague so that it did not put Cohen
on sufficient notice to know what offensive conduct was prohibited.96
93. See Cohen v. California, 403 U.S. 15, 22, 26 (1971).
94. See id. at 26 ("[T]he State may not [, absent a more compelling reason,] ... make
the simple public display here involved of this single four-letter expletive a criminal
offense."). The Court's concern with the severity of the penalty was reaffirmed in
Pacifica. See FCC v. Pacifica Found., 438 U.S. 726, 750 (1978) (emphasizing that the Court
"ha[s] not decided that an occasional expletive in ... this broadcast would justify a
criminal prosecution"); cf Cohen, supra note 57, at 1602-03 (concluding that Cohen "has
settled the proposition that a criminal statute is unconstitutional if it punishes all public
use of profanity without reference to details such as the nature of the location and
audience").
95. See Cohen, 403 U.S. at 22 (explaining that the presence of unwilling listeners
cannot justify a conviction when "there [is] no evidence that persons powerless to avoid
appellant's conduct did in fact object to it"). The Court in Pacifica also referenced this
factor, explaining that "the Commission was responding to a listener's strenuous
complaint, and [that] Pacifica d[id] not question [the Commission's] determination that
this afternoon broadcast was likely to offend listeners." Pacifica, 438 U.S. at 747 n.25
(plurality opinion).
96. See Cohen, 403 U.S. at 22 n.4 (comparing the offensive conduct section of the
statute to other sections in concluding that Cohen was not put on sufficient notice). This
concept is commonly referred to as the vagueness and overbreadth doctrine in First
Amendment jurisprudence. See JESSE H. CHOPER ET AL., CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 667
(9th ed. 2001) (explaining that "[t]he doctrines of 'vagueness' and 'overbreadth'... are
deeply embedded in first amendment jurisprudence"). Generally, a "statute creating a
new offense must be sufficiently explicit to inform those who are subject to it what
conduct on their part will render them liable to its penalties" in order for it to be
constitutional. Connally v. Gen. Constr. Co., 269 U.S. 385, 391 (1926). The Court in
Connally went on to explain that "a statute which either forbids or requires the doing of
an act in terms so vague that men of common intelligence must necessarily guess at its
meaning and differ as to its application, violates the first essential of due process of law."
Id.; see also Coates v. City of Cincinnati, 402 U.S. 611, 614 (1971) (finding that an
ordinance prohibiting three or more people assembled together from "annoy[ing] any
police officer or other person who should happen to pass by" was unconstitutionally vague
because "[c]onduct that annoys some people does not annoy others").
Overbreadth is closely related to vagueness. CHOPER ET AL., supra, at 667. A First
Amendment overbreadth argument is a claim that a regulation prohibits more speech than
constitutionally permissible to achieve the state's purpose. See, e.g., Erznoznik, 422 U.S.
at 213-14 (discussing why an ordinance prohibiting the display of nudity at a drive-in
movie theater could not be justified based on the government's interest in prohibiting such
exposure to children). In Erznoznik, the Court reasoned that the ordinance "sweepingly
forbids display of all films containing any [nudity], irrespective of context or
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Therefore, in addition to the two-prong test established in Cohen,97 a
state actor must satisfy these three additional factors when attempting to
regulate offensive speech.
IV. UNIVERSITY SPEECH REGULATIONS MUST PASS THE COHEN TEST
IN ORDER To SURVIVE FIRST AMENDMENT SCRUTINY
In order for a University's regulation of speech at an on-campus
basketball game to pass First Amendment scrutiny, it will receive the
same analysis as did the California ordinance in Cohen.98 The issue in
pervasiveness." Id. at 213; see also supra note 88 (summarizing the facts of Erznoznik).
Therefore, even if the Court had recognized the city's interest in protecting children on
the street from obscene material as consistent with the First Amendment, the ordinance
would have been classified as overbroad. Erznoznik, 422 U.S. at 213-14. For a discussion
of the First Amendment vagueness and overbreadth doctrine, see CHOPER ET AL., supra,
at 667-70.
97. See supra note 47 and accompanying text.
98. See supra Part I. In applying the test articulated by the Court in Spence to the
context of fan behavior, there is little doubt that any regulation would fall within the reach
of the First Amendment. Fan behavior is afforded the protection of the First Amendment
when the speaker intends to communicate a message and the message is likely to be
understood by those receiving it. See Spence v. Washington, 418 U.S. 405, 410-11 (1974).
Regulating expressive fan conduct passes the first element of the Spence test because the
intent of those participating in the various cheers is to communicate a message to the
players, whether it's encouragement for the home team or disdain for the visitors. See
Incivility and Profanity at Athletic Events, supra note 8, at 3226-27 (explaining that fans
hope to have an impact on the game by making the arena a "tough place to play"). In
looking to the controversy created by the incident at the University of Maryland, it is clear
that the second element of the test is satisfied, because those who hear the chants have a
clear understanding of the message. See Snider, supra note 9 (noting that the conduct at
University of Maryland's arena "angered and embarrassed school officials and alumni");
Vecsey, supra note 21 (commenting on the embarrassment caused by the University of
Maryland students' behavior); cf Dick Heller, No Cheers for the Rude and Crude Fans,
WASH. TIMES, May 5, 2004, at C1 (explaining that the damage to the University's image
caused by the chants broadcast nationally "seemed almost incalculable"). Therefore, any
attempt by a public university to regulate expressive fan conduct should receive First
Amendment scrutiny.
However, the First Amendment does not require heightened judicial scrutiny in all
situations. See supra notes 29-30 and accompanying text. As articulated by the Court in
Texas v. Johnson, 491 U.S. 397 (1989), a regulation implicating the First Amendment will
only receive heightened judicial scrutiny when the purpose of the regulation involves the
communicative impact of the conduct being regulated. Id. at 411. Turning to a
university's desire to prevent certain obscene words from being forced onto those
attending a game, any regulation preventing such conduct will concern the content of the
cheer. See, e.g., Brady, supra note 3 (quoting the Big Ten Conference Commissioner as
saying "[w]e're aware that the use of obscenities at games is a big issue in certain places");
Memorandum, supra note 5, at t (commenting that the University of Maryland's purpose
in regulating would be "to prohibit and punish use of certain language"). Unless the
University attempts to prohibit all cheering from the arena, and thus defeating a primary
purpose of being a fan, see Incivility and Profanity at Athletic Events, supra note 8, at 3226-
27 (explaining that part of being a fan is "making the arena a 'tough place to play' for
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Cohen was whether the defendant could be convicted and punished due
to the "offensiveness" of the phrase "Fuck the Draft" on his jacket
without violating his First Amendment rights.99 Similarly, the issue facing
public universities is whether authorities may implement regulations on
profane and vulgar fan language, because of its offensiveness, without
violating the Constitution.' °° Since the university's reason for regulating
the language at campus sporting events is the same as California's
purpose in enacting the statute at issue in Cohen,'0 ' public universities
will have to demonstrate that "substantial privacy interests are being
invaded in an essentially intolerable manner" in order to not violate the
• 102
speaker's First Amendment rights.
V. A CLOSER LOOK AT COHEN: HOW A UNIVERSITY CAN DRAFT A
REGULATION CONSISTENT WITH THE CAPTIVE AUDIENCE DOCTRINE
The test articulated in Cohen, as clarified in subsequent case law,
requires the public actor to satisfy two elements. 3 First, the regulation
must be closely tailored to protect substantial privacy interests."°" In
addition, the actor, in this case a public university, must show that the
privacy interests it seeks to protect are being invaded in an essentially
intolerable manner, in the sense that an unwilling listener cannot easily
avoid the unwanted speech.
A. Substantial Privacy Interests
Based on Supreme Court precedent, a university should be able to
regulate fan speech for the benefit of substantial privacy interests. As
demonstrated by case law subsequent to Cohen, the interest of the
opposing teams" through various cheers), any interest in singling out certain cheers for
regulation will inevitably be tied to their content (in this situation, their "offensiveness").
See Wasserman, supra note 3, at 379-80 (contrasting the idea of singling out particular
profane or offensive oral messages as prohibited while allowing other related messages
with a content-neutral regulation of sound and noise levels). For these reasons, although
the issue of disruptive conduct has been recommended to circumvent heightened First
Amendment scrutiny, see Memorandum, supra note 5, at 1 n.2 (explaining that an
argument could be made that the regulation involves conduct outside the scope of the
First Amendment), any university proscription of fan behavior at sporting events will
receive heightened judicial scrutiny.
99. See Cohen, 403 U.S. at 16-18.
100. See Brady, supra note 3; Barry Svrluga, U-Md. is Advised on Offensive Speech at
Comcast Center, WASH. POST, Mar. 27, 2004, at D1 (highlighting the University of
Maryland's concern over profanity at games).
101. Cohen, 403 U.S. at 16-18.
102. Id. at 21; see also 16A AM. JUR. 2D Constitutional Law § 475 (1998).
103. Cohen, 403 U.S. at 21.
104. Id.
105. Id.; see also 16A AM. JUR. 2D Constitutional Law § 475 (1998).
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unwilling listener to be left alone at home is a substantial privacy
interest. Therefore, the University could regulate on behalf of the
privacy interests of those watching the game on television or listening to
the game on the radio. 107
Furthermore, in reversing Cohen's conviction, the Supreme Court
acknowledged in dictum that a privacy interest may exist outside of one's
home. 108  Despite ultimately overturning Cohen's sentence, the Court
explained that "one has a ... substantial claim to a recognizable privacy
interest when walking through a courthouse corridor."'0 9  In cases
subsequent to Cohen, the Court has reinforced its willingness to
recognize the privacy interests of citizens outside of the home in certain
contexts." °
106. See Frisby v. Schultz, 487 U.S. 474, 484-85 (1988); FCC v. Pacifica Found., 438
U.S. 726, 748 (1978); Rowan v. U. S. Post Office Dept., 397 U.S. 728, 736 (1970). But see
Strauss, supra note 49, at 95 (arguing that the Court has "broadly painted a picture of the
captive audience within the home, and minimized a court's unwanted obligation to
scrutinize whether an at-home recipient of unwanted information is able to avoid the
speech").
107. See Pacifica, 438 U.S. at 748. Congress has also expressed recent interest in
protecting children from exposure to indecent broadcast programming. See Broadcast
Decency Enforcement Act of 2004, S. REP. No. 108-253, at 1; Broadcast Decency
Enforcement Act of 2004, H.R. REP. No. 108-434, at 5. In the House Report, Congress
listed a number of recent incidents on television and radio broadcast involving indecent
and profane behavior "inappropriate for family viewing, particularly given that so many
children were apt to be watching it on television." Id. at 6. Indecent, profane, and
obscene language on public radio or television broadcast is already subject to fines and
even incarceration in some circumstances. See 18 U.S.C. § 1464 (2000). However, in
response to the recent concern over indecency, Congress explained that "[a]ll of these
examples [of indecency] have highlighted the need for stronger penalties for broadcast
obscenity, indecency and profanity." H.R. REP. No. 108-434, at 6. In pushing for stronger
enforcement requirements, Congress emphasized that "American families should be able
to rely on the fact that, at times when their children are likely to be tuning in, broadcast
television and radio programming will be free of indecency, obscenity, and profanity." Id.
at 7. This explanation displays society's recent increase in support for protecting children
from exposure to inappropriate language and lends support to a university's justification
for regulating fan speech at sporting events. Further, an increase in FCC penalties for
indecent broadcasts could increase the probability that a public television or radio station
would cease to broadcast a particular university's games if the university's crowd develops
a reputation for inappropriate conduct. Tying the hands of a university in such a situation
by not allowing them to deter harmful behavior surely would not be equitable.
108. See Cohen, 403 U.S. at 21-22.
109. Id. at 21.
110. See, e.g., Bethel Sch. Dist. No. 403 v. Fraser, 478 U.S. 675, 684 (1986) (recognizing
the interest in restricting vulgar language at a public school assembly in order to protect
minors); Heffron v. Int'l Soc'y for Krishna Consciousness, Inc., 452 U.S. 640, 657 & n.1
(1981) (Brennan, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part) (recognizing a privacy
interest of fairgoers implicitly by establishing that the fairgoers were not a "captive
audience" from solicitors approaching them with pamphlets because the fairgoers could
simply refuse the pamphlets and walk away); Erznoznik v. City of Jacksonville, 422 U.S.
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In particular, the Court in Fraser recognized the state's interest, acting
in loco parentis, in protecting teenage students in a captive audience
from indecent speech at a public school. 1 By directly citing Pacifica, the
Court established that a parent's privacy interest in protecting his or her
child from inappropriate language extends beyond the home.
1 2
Furthermore, while a sports arena environment involves more open
discourse than a public school, other cases have supported the unwilling
listener's entitlement to some privacy in environments where people
commonly communicate publicly."' In fact, the Court has even
acknowledged that there may be a claim to privacy on the public streets,
205, 212 (1975) (referencing "the limited privacy interest of persons on the public
streets"); Lehman v. City of Shaker Heights, 418 U.S. 298, 307 (1974) (Douglas, J.,
concurring) (allowing state to prohibit political ads on streetcars to protect passengers
from "forced intrusions on their privacy"); Rosenfeld v. New Jersey, 408 U.S. 901, 907 n.1
(1972) (Powell, J., dissenting) (referring to the audience of public school board meeting as
captive); see also Ken Gormley, One Hundred Years of Privacy, 1992 Wis. L. REV. 1335,
1383 (explaining that the Court has recognized the privacy right of the unwilling listener
outside of the home as "a legitimate right to be reckoned with under the First
Amendment"). But see Strauss, supra note 49, at 109-16 (proposing a more stringent test
for establishing an unwilling listener's right to be left alone). Specifically, Strauss argues
that "[t]hree specific interests underlie the right to be let alone in the captive audience
context: the right to make individual choices (autonomy); the right to repose; and the right
to be free from offense." Id. at 108. Strauss believes that the captive audience doctrine
advances these interests imprecisely because the Court simply asserts the right to be left
alone. Id.
111. Fraser, 478 U.S. at 683-84.
112. See id. at 684. In allowing the public school to regulate, the Court concluded that
"[t]he process of educating our youth for citizenship in public schools is not confined to
books, the curriculum, and the civics class" and that the older students, as role models,
should "demonstrate the appropriate form of civil discourse and political expression by
their conduct and deportment in and out of class." Id. at 683. An argument could be
made that the fans affiliated with a public university sports team are equally scrutinized by
younger fans as role models, considering society's overwhelming obsession with modern-
day sports. See TOM MCMILLEN WITH PAUL COGGINS, OUT OF BOUNDS 21-25 (1992)
(explaining that the popularity of sports among the youth of America has "passed beyond
a pleasant diversion and bec[o]me a national obsession in our country"). However, Fraser
can be distinguished by the fact that the purpose of the public school system is to teach
students the "fundamental values of 'habits and manners of civility' essential to a
democratic society." Fraser, 478 U.S. at 681. A public university hosts sporting events to
provide entertainment for the students and alumni and to raise revenue for the University.
Therefore, while a university speech code could not be justified using the same reasoning
used in Fraser, the large impact that sporting events have on children, see MCMILLEN,
supra, at 21-25, certainly should be noted as a factor in establishing a privacy interest.
113. See, e.g., Hill v. Colorado, 530 U.S. 703, 716-17 (2000) (recognizing privacy
interests in various public environments); Lehman, 418 U.S. at 307 (Douglas, J.,
concurring) (acknowledging "the right of the commuters [on a public streetcar] to be free
from forced intrusions on their privacy"); see also Gormley, supra note 110, at 1383.
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a traditionally public forum. 114 Therefore, based on the Court's emphasis
on the importance of protecting children from indecent language' and
the high probability that many children will be subjected to offensive116
language, a university has a justifiably substantial interest in protecting
children at basketball games from offensive language.'
1 7
114. See Erznoznik, 422 U.S. at 212 (recognizing a "limited privacy interest of persons
on the public streets"); Hague v. Comm. for Indus. Org., 307 U.S. 496, 515-16 (1939)
(establishing the streets and parks as a public forum). Even though the Court recognized
a limited privacy interests on public streets in Erznoznik, it ended up invalidating the
ordinance because the unwilling listeners on the street could avoid the offensive speech by
averting their eyes. See Erznoznik, 422 U.S. at 212. However, the fact that the Court
went into the captive audience analysis rather than denying the unwilling listener any
claim to privacy on a public street displays the Court's willingness to consider privacy
interests in most contexts. Cf Gormley, supra note 110, at 1383; Zych, supra note 68, at
1291 (referring to the Court's "continuum of privacy interests in public spaces").
115. See Fraser, 478 U.S. at 684; FCC v. Pacifica Found., 438 U.S. 726, 749-50 (1978);
Erznoznik, 422 U.S. at 212 ("It is well settled that a State or municipality can adopt more
stringent controls on communicative materials available to youths than on those available
to adults."); Ginsberg v. New York, 390 U.S. 629, 639 (1968).
116. See supra note 112 (highlighting the popularity of sports among youth audiences).
The popularity of sports among young people results in a large number of children in
attendance at sporting events, which is essential to justifying a prohibition on indecent
speech. See, e.g., Broadcast Decency Enforcement Act of 2004, H.R. REP. No. 108-434, at
7 (explaining that the FCC prohibits public broadcast of indecent speech between the
hours of 6 a.m. to 10 p.m. because it is "the time period when children are most likely to
be watching television and listening to the radio"). In explaining the need to increase
penalties on public broadcasters for broadcasting indecent programming within this time
frame, Congress emphasized incidents of inappropriate behavior at "family friendly"
events where "many children were apt to be watching it on television." Id. at 6. In
particular, Congress mentioned the halftime show of Super Bowl XXXVIII, which ended
in the exposure of Janet Jackson's breast, as a paradigmatic example of the need for
stricter measures to ensure indecent conduct does not reach a family-oriented audience.
Id. Using this logic, a university should justify its prevention of indecent cheers as
necessary to create a "family friendly" environment, where many children are in
attendance. Similar to FCC regulation during hours when children are likely to be
watching television, id. at 7, a university could justify its regulation of indecent speech in
certain circumstances, such as the sporting arena during a basketball game, due to the
increased presence of children at the game. See infra note 117.
117. See New York v. Ferber, 458 U.S. 747, 756-57 (1982). In Ferber, the Supreme
Court used the following language to establish the strength of a state actor's interest in
protecting children:
It is evident beyond the need for elaboration that a State's interest in
"safeguarding the physical and psychological well-being of a minor" is
"compelling." "A democratic society rests, for its continuance, upon the healthy,
well-rounded growth of young people into full maturity as citizens."
Accordingly, we have sustained legislation aimed at protecting the physical and
emotional well-being of youth even when the laws have operated in the sensitive
area of constitutionally protected rights.
Id. (citations omitted); see also Prince v. Massachusetts, 321 U.S. 158, 165 (1944) ("It is the
interest of youth itself, and of the whole community, that children be both safeguarded
from abuses and given opportunities for growth into free and independent well-developed
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B. Essentially Intolerable Manner
The second element of the Cohen test requires that a university
regulate on behalf of a captive audience's privacy interests. In
overturning Cohen's conviction, the Court emphasized that "the statute
upon which Cohen's conviction rests evinces no concern . . . with the
special plight of the captive auditor.' 1 .8 Assuming that this analysis in
Cohen was not mere surplusage,1 9 the Court should uphold a regulation
... citizens."). This language was used to establish the FCC's compelling state interest in
regulating indecent public broadcast during times when large numbers of children are
watching. See Action for Children's Television v. FCC, 58 F.3d 654, 661-64 (D.C. Cir.
1995). A university should be able to use the same justification for its regulation of
indecent speech at a basketball game on behalf of the privacy interest of the large number
of children in attendance. See supra note 112.
118. Cohen v. California, 403 U.S. 15, 22 (1971).
119. Some scholars cast serious doubt about the validity of this language by arguing
that the Court has yet to uphold a content-based regulation outside of the home based on
the captive audience doctrine. See, e.g., Volokh, supra note 91, at 1833 ("[T]he Court...
has never upheld ... a [content-based] restriction [based on the captive audience doctrine]
outside the home."). In making this conclusion, Volokh compared Rowan v. United States
Post Office Department, 397 U.S. 728 (1970), with Cohen. See Volokh, supra note 91, at
1834-35. He argued that "[t]he viewers in Cohen were actually more captive than the
householder[s] in Rowan" because the householders could dispose of the mail while the
viewers in the courtroom could only avert their eyes from Cohen's jacket. Id. Therefore,
Volokh concluded that the protection granted the householders in Rowan must have
turned on their presence at home. See id.
However, Volokh failed to consider the complete factual basis behind the Rowan
decision. The statute at issue in Rowan prevented a mailer from sending materials to a
household only after the mailer was put on notice that specific addresses no longer desired
to receive the materials. See Rowan, 397 U.S. at 732. In finding the statute valid, the
Court articulated that "the mailer's right to communicate is circumscribed only by an
affirmative act of the addressee giving notice that he wishes no further mailings from that
mailer." Id. at 737. Absent this affirmative act, the Court would likely not find the
householder a captive audience. See supra notes 68-75 and accompanying text. Therefore,
the key fact that distinguishes Rowan from Cohen is that the audience in Rowan had put
the speaker on notice that it no longer wished to receive the message rather than the fact
that audience happened to be at home when receiving the message.
Volokh also compared Rosenfeld v. New Jersey, 408 U.S. 901 (1972), with FCC v.
Pacifica Found. to support his conclusion. Volokh, supra note 91, at 1835. He concluded
that the audience at the public school board meeting in Rosenfeld was more captive than
the audience of the radio broadcast in Pacifica because the audience of a radio broadcast
may turn off the radio while the audience of a public meeting is forced to leave the room
in order to avoid the message. Id. Using similar logic as his comparison of Cohen to
Rowan, Volokh concluded that the Court distinguished these two cases based on the
privacy of the home. Id.
Again, Volokh erred in his analysis of the facts. The Court vacated Rosenfeld's
conviction and remanded the case to the Superior Court of New Jersey so that the lower
court could reconsider the conviction in light of Cohen and Gooding v. Wilson, 405 U.S.
518 (1972), which the Court decided subsequent to Rosenfeld's conviction. See Rosenfeld,
408 U.S. at 901-02; Gooding, 405 U.S. at 518 (listing date of decision as subsequent to
Rosenfeld's conviction). On remand, the Supreme Court of New Jersey found that the
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of speech when its purpose is to protect a captive audience. In fact,
subsequent case law applying the Cohen test has established that there
must be a captive audience in order to prove that privacy interests have
been invaded in an intolerable manner.121
Having established its importance, the captive audience doctrine needs
clarification. In Frisby v. Schultz,22 the Court upheld an ordinance
prohibiting picketing outside one's home because "[t]he resident is
figuratively, and perhaps literally, trapped within the home, and.., is left
with no ready means of avoiding the unwanted speech.', 23 Similarly, in
Lehman, the city was allowed to prohibit political ads on public
transportation because the "audience [was] incapable of declining to
receive it. 12 4 These two decisions emphasize the importance the Court
places on the unwilling listener's ability to avoid the unpleasant
125
message.
statute used to convict the speaker was unconstitutionally overbroad and therefore upheld
the vacated conviction. See State v. Rosenfeld, 303 A.2d 889, 892-93 (N.J. 1973). Not only
did the Supreme Court not issue an opinion on whether the audience of a public school
board meeting would be captive to offensive speech, the Supreme Court of New Jersey
vacated the conviction based on the unconstitutionality of the statute's language rather
than on the specific facts of the case at bar. See id. at 894. Volokh's comparison of
Rosenfeld to Pacifica is unpersuasive because the Rosenfeld opinion did not establish
whether the audience was captive, and is not binding authority.
Even accepting Volokh's argument, the premise that no content-based regulation on
behalf of the captive audience outside of the home would ever be valid is tenuous. The
statute in Cohen prohibited "offensive speech," which the Court established as effectively
a prohibition on restricting content-based speech. See Cohen, 403 U.S. at 16, 18-19.
However, instead of concluding that California is absolutely barred from prohibiting
"offensive speech" in public (the position Volokh supports), the Court used a different
rationale to invalidate the statute. See supra text accompanying note 118. Based on this
analysis, the Cohen opinion provides support for the proposition that a state may regulate
"offensive speech" in public in certain situations. Id.
120. See Cohen, 403 U.S. at 22.
121. See Consol. Edison Co. of N.Y. v. Pub. Serv. Comm'n, 447 U.S. 530, 541-42 (1980)
("[T]he First Amendment does not permit the government to prohibit speech as intrusive
unless the 'captive' audience cannot avoid objectionable speech.").
122. 487 U.S. 474 (1988).
123. Id. at 487.
124. Lehman v. City of Shaker Heights, 418 U.S. 298, 307 (1974) (Douglas, J.,
concurring). While this language comes from the concurring opinion, the majority opinion
in Lehman agrees with Douglas' conclusion that the unwilling listeners were captive and
used this conclusion as a factor in its decision to invalidate the statute. See supra note 81
and accompanying text.
125. See supra notes 122-24 and accompanying text; see also Denver Area Educ.
Telecomms. Consortium, Inc. v. FCC, 518 U.S. 727, 744 (1996) (plurality opinion)
(emphasizing that the broadcast media contacts the recipient without sufficient warning to
avert one's eyes); FCC v. Pacifica Found., 438 U.S. 726, 748-49 (1978) (finding that the
audience of a public radio broadcast is exposed to unexpected program content without
warning); Columbia Broad. Sys., Inc. v. Democratic Nat. Comm., 412 U.S. 94, 127 (1973)
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However, in Erznoznik, the Court found the prohibition of movies
containing nudity at drive-in movie theaters to be unconstitutional
because "[t]he ordinance seeks only to keep these films from being seen
from public streets and places where the offended viewer readily can
avert his [or her] eyes" and "the screen of a drive-in theater is not 'so
obtrusive as to make it impossible for an unwilling individual to avoid
exposure to it.""" The Court used similar analysis in Watchtower Bible
& Tract Society of New York, Inc. v. Village of Stratton2 7 where a
prohibition on door-to-door solicitation was found to be unconstitutional
because the privacy of a resident can be protected by using a "No
Solicitation" sign or by simply refusing to engage in conversation with
the solicitor.
12
8
In comparing these decisions, it appears that the key factor in
determining whether the unwilling listeners are captive is the listener's
ability to avoid the message.2 9 In making this distinction, the Court will
analyze the practicality of the alternatives available for the unwilling
listener in deciding whether the listener's privacy interest should
(documenting "the reality that in a very real sense listeners and viewers [of public
broadcasts] constitute a 'captive audience"').
126. Id. at 212 (quoting Redrup v. New York, 386 U.S. 767, 769 (1967)); accord
Heffron v. Int'l. Soc'y For Krishna Consciousness, Inc., 452 U.S. 640, 657 n.1 (1981)
(Brennan, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part) (concluding that fair attendants are
not a captive audience in relation to pamphleteers because "fairgoers are fully capable of
saying 'no'... and then walking away"); Spence v. Washington, 418 U.S. 405, 412 (1974)
(finding that viewers of a doctored American flag were not a captive audience because
"[a]nyone who might have been offended could easily have avoided the display"). But see
Hill v. Colorado, 530 U.S. 703, 718 & n.25 (2000) (finding that the risk of causing physical
and emotional harm to a woman entering a health care clinic by approaching her without
consent is sufficient to allow the government to prohibit such conduct).
127. 536 U.S. 150 (2002).
128. See id. at 168; accord Sable Commc'ns of Cal., Inc. v. FCC, 492 U.S. 115, 128
(1989) (finding that indecent phone calls were not imposed on a captive audience because
the recipient must take affirmative steps to receive contact); Bolger v. Youngs Drug Prods.
Corp., 463 U.S. 60, 72 (1983) (holding that recipients of objectionable mailings are not a
captive audience because they may simply avert their eyes or throw the message away).
129. For an excellent argument as to why the captive audience doctrine's focus must
be on the speaker's ability to avoid the message, see J.M. Balkin, Free Speech and Hostile
Environments, 99 COLUM. L. REV. 2295, 2311-13 (1999). Balkin emphasizes that
"[c]aptivity in [the] sense [of the captive audience doctrine] is a matter of practicality
rather than necessity" and that the point of the doctrine is that it is unfair for the speaker
to be able to coerce the unwilling listener into a difficult choice. Id. at 2312. In summary,
Balkin argues that the "[c]aptive audience doctrine should not focus on particular spaces"
but "[r]ather, it should regulate particular situations where people are particularly subject
to unjust and intolerable harassment and coercion." Id.; cf Strauss, supra note 49, at 89
(explaining that the captive audience doctrine turns on the burden that would be placed
on the unwilling listener in avoiding the message).
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outweigh the speaker's First Amendment right.130 That being said, the
Court may be more receptive to finding the audience captive when they
are subject to oral, rather than written, communications.13' Therefore, a
university regulation should focus on inappropriate fan cheers rather
than offensive signs or apparel.
C. Other Factors
In addition to the captive audience doctrine, the Court will consider
three other factors in determining the constitutionality of a speech
regulation. The Court will consider the severity of the penalty imposed
for violating the regulation.'32 In addition, the unwilling listeners must
voice their objection to the controversial speech. 3 3  Finally, the
130. See Cohen v. California, 403 U.S. 15, 21 (1971) (explaining that the unwilling
listeners in the courthouse could simply look away from the offensive message); compare
Lehman v. City of Shaker Heights, 418 U.S. 298, 307 (1974) (Douglas, J., concurring)
(finding passengers of a streetcar to be captive because they cannot avoid advertisements),
with Bolger, 463 U.S. at 72 (explaining that the recipients of unwanted mail are not a
captive audience because the recipient can simply avert his or her eyes and throw the mail
away). For an interesting discussion of the balancing of conflicting rights in the context of
the captive audience doctrine, see Strauss, supra note 49, at 116-21. Strauss proposes that
the Court should balance three factors in employing the captive audience doctrine: the
justification for protecting an unwilling audience, the difficulty for the listener to avoid the
speech, and the significance of "the infringement on the First Amendment right to
freedom of expression." Id. at 116.
131. Compare Denver Area Educ. Telecomms. Consortium, Inc. v. FCC, 518 U.S. 727,
744 (1996) (plurality opinion) (finding the audience of public access cable channels a
captive audience), and FCC v. Pacifica Found., 438 U.S. 726, 748 (1978) (concluding that
listeners of radio broadcasts are a captive audience), with Heffron v. Int'l Soc'y For
Krishna Consciousness, Inc., 452 U.S. 640, 657 n.1 (1981) (Brennan, J., concurring)
(finding that recipients of pamphlets are not a captive audience), and Bigelow v. Virginia,
421 U.S. 809, 828 (1975) (explaining that readers of newspaper advertisements are not a
captive audience). The Court even mentioned this distinction in Pacifica by saying that
oral communications have a greater chance of reaching children than written
communications. See Pacifica, 438 U.S. at 749-50. This case law is consistent with the
Court's explanation in Cohen that the audience "could effectively avoid further
bombardment of their sensibilities simply by averting their eyes." Cohen, 403 U.S. at 21.
For an analysis of the oral/written distinction in the context of the captive audience
doctrine, see Haiman, supra note 57, at 182-85.
132. See Pacifica, 438 U.S. at 750 (emphasizing that the Court "ha[s] not decided that
an occasional expletive in ... this broadcast would justify a criminal prosecution"); Cohen,
403 U.S. at 26 (explaining that "the State may not [absent a more compelling reason]
make the simple public display here involved of this single four-letter expletive a criminal
offense"); cf Cohen, supra note 57, at 1602-03 (concluding that Cohen "has settled the
proposition that a criminal statute is unconstitutional if it punishes all public use of
profanity without reference to details such as the nature of the location and audience").
133. Compare Pacifica, 438 U.S. at 747 n.25 (plurality opinion) (emphasizing that "the
Commission was responding to a listener's strenuous complaint, and [that] Pacifica d[id]
not question [the Commission's] determination that this afternoon broadcast was likely to
offend listeners"), with Cohen, 403 U.S. at 22 (explaining that the presence of unwilling
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regulation must put the audience on sufficient notice of whatever
behavior is prohibited. 134
In light of this analysis, a university may regulate offensive fan
behavior at campus sporting events if: 1) the purpose of the regulation is
to protect the substantial privacy interests of unwilling listeners, 2) the
unwilling listeners are a captive audience, 3) the sanctions imposed by
the regulation are not excessive, 4) there is documentation that there are
in fact unwilling listeners, and 5) the regulation clearly defines the
prohibited behavior.
VI. THE BIG TEN CONFERENCE'S REGULATION IS INCONSISTENT WITH
THE CAPTIVE AUDIENCE DOCTRINE
The pertinent part of the Big Ten Conference's Crowd Control
Initiative holds a university responsible for "school sponsored student
sections that attack or single out student-athletes.', 3 5 The initiative was
adopted after the 2002-2003 athletic season, focusing mainly on the
security and welfare of student-athletes, coaches, officials, and fans.
136
In analyzing the objective of the initiative, its primary focus is on
protecting the student-athlete from a harmful environment. ' With that
purpose in mind, it is difficult for the Big Ten to justify its actions based
on the privacy interests of student-athletes. In looking at the type of
conduct the Big Ten hopes to prevent, 11 it appears to be more interested
in protecting each student athlete's personal life.139 Any argument for
protecting the personal life of a student-athlete is difficult to justify
because the Court is likely to find that the student-athlete chose to thrust
himself or herself into the spotlight of such criticism.
14 0
listeners cannot justify a conviction when "there was no evidence that persons powerless
to avoid appellant's conduct did in fact object to it").
134. See supra note 96.
135. Press Release, supra note 12.
136. Id.
137. See id.
138. See, e.g., Brady, supra note 3 (describing an incident where a student section
chanted "No means no!" towards an opposing player who was recently indicted on sexual
assault charges).
139. See id. (quoting the Big Ten Commissioner as saying "[t]hey harass an 18-,19- or
20-year-old kid for two hours. That's not right").
140. See Gertz v. Robert Welch, Inc., 418 U.S. 323, 352 (1974) (demonstrating that the
Court will treat those of general fame and notoriety different in the context of defamation
law); New York Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254, 270-72 (1964) (explaining that First
Amendment rights are heightened in areas of public concern). For a summary on the
Court's case law surrounding a public figure's right to privacy, see generally CHOPER ET
AL., supra note 96, at 609-45.
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Even if the Court upholds the Big Ten Conference's purpose, the
initiative regulates conduct that would not violate the student-athlete's
privacy interest in an intolerable manner. By preventing the crowd from
singling out student-athletes, 141 the initiative prohibits certain conduct
that should receive protection from the First Amendment because it does
not distinguish among the types of media used to deliver the message.142
For example, a sign displaying the message "Player X does drugs" would
most likely qualify as a violation of the initiative even though Player X
(or any other offended viewer) could simply avert his or her eyes.143
Therefore, the Court would likely find that the Big Ten Conference's
initiative violates the second element of the Cohen test.
However, even if the Court were to uphold the regulation, the Big Ten
Conference could adopt a more effective way to alleviate its concern
over the use of obscenities at public university sporting events. 144
VII. SANITIZING THE ARENA: A SOLUTION TO OFFENSIVE SPEECH AT
PUBLIC UNIVERSITY BASKETBALL GAMES
A. Proposed Model Regulation
The following model regulation achieves a public university's goal of
preventing offensive speech without violating the audience's First
Amendment rights:
Section (1): For the purposes of this regulation, the following
definitions apply:
Indecent language-language that depicts or describes, in
terms patently offensive as measured by contemporary
community standards, sexual or excretory activities or
organs.
45
Obscene language-language that, when taken as a whole,
appeals to the prurient interest in sex, portrays sexual
141. See Press Release, supra note 12.
142. See supra Part V.B.
143. See Cohen v. California, 403 U.S. 15, 21 (1971) (explaining that the unwilling
listeners could avert their eyes from Cohen's jacket). In fact, an argument can be made
that the ambiguity of the Big Ten's initiative unnecessarily sweeps in conduct in support of
a student-athlete, such as a sign stating "Player X helps the homeless." See Press Release,
supra note 12 (failing to distinguish between types of conduct singling out players in
prohibiting all "school sponsored student sections that ... single out student-athletes").
144. See Brady, supra note 3 (documenting the Big Ten Commissioner's concern for
the use of obscenity at games).
145. This definition of indecency mirrors the FCC's definition of indecency. See infra
note 152 and accompanying text.
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conduct in a patently offensive way and does not have
146
serious literary, artistic, political, or scientific value.
Profane language -language that, when measured by
contemporary community standards, naturally tends to
provoke violent resentment, or denoting language so grossly
offensive to members of the public who actually hear it as to
147
amount to a nuisance .
Section (2): The University recognizes that collegiate
basketball games are observed by a significant number of
minors, either by attending the game directly, watching the
game on public television, or listening to the game on public
radio. While the University understands the significance of the
fans' right to express themselves, that right must be balanced
against the state's and parents' interest in protecting children
from exposure to indecent, obscene, and profane language, and
against the privacy interests of those attending the game or
listening to the game on television or radio. The University
therefore concludes that it is appropriate to enact a regulation
that prohibits indecent, obscene, and profane speech while
attending a school-affiliated basketball game on the
University's campus.
Section (3): Any person attending a school-affiliated basketball
game on the University's campus is prohibited from
participating in or attempting to start an obscene, indecent, or
profane cheer.
Section (4): Any person in violation of Section (3) of this
regulation is subject to the following disciplinary measures:
a) A first-time violator is subject to an official warning from
a University employee that future violations of this
regulation may result in ejection from the game and ban
from future school-sponsored events.
b) A second-time violator may be ejected from the premises
by an official University employee.
c) A violator of Section (3) of this regulation more than two
times within a one-year time span may be banned from all
146. The Supreme Court adopted this definition of obscenity in Miller v. California.
See infra note 151 and accompanying text.
147. The FCC has used this language to define profanity. See infra note 153 and
accompanying text.
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University sporting events for a period not to exceed one
year from the most recent violation.
B. The Proposed Model Regulation Is Not Unconstitutionally Vague
The proposed model regulation provides detailed definitions of the
regulated conduct.' 48 In fact, the reference to obscene, indecent, and
profane language mirrors a section of the United States Code. 141 In
defining obscene language, the model regulation uses a standard that has
been upheld by the Supreme Court.50 Further, in defining indecent
language, the model regulation uses the same standards as the FCC in its
enforcement of the ban on obscene, indecent, or profane language in
radio broadcasts.' Finally, the United States Court of Appeals for the
148. See supra Part VII.A., § 1.
149. See 18 U.S.C. § 1464 (2000).
150. See Miller v. California, 413 U.S. 15, 24 (1973); supra Part VII.A., § 1. In
explaining the application of the Miller test, the Court set out guidelines for the trier of
fact to use in determining whether material is obscene:
(a) whether "the average person, applying contemporary community standards"
would find that the work, taken as a whole, appeals to the prurient interest; (b)
whether the work depicts or describes, in a patently offensive way, sexual
conduct specifically defined by the applicable state law; and (c) whether the
work, taken as a whole, lacks serious literary, artistic, political, or scientific value.
Miller, 413 U.S. at 24 (citations omitted). The Court recognized the difficulty in
establishing clear standards as to what constitutes obscenity, but nonetheless concluded
that succumbing to an "absolutist, 'anything goes' view of the First Amendment" would be
"'inconsistent with [the Court's] duty to uphold the constitutional guarantees."' Id. at 29
(citations omitted). Based on the Miller opinion, the standard for obscenity in the
proposed regulation places the speaker on sufficient notice to overcome any vagueness
challenge. For a summary of obscenity law, see CHOPER ET AL., supra note 96, at 645-67.
151. See Indus. Guidance on the Comm'ns Case Law Interpreting 18 U.S.C. § 1464 &
Enforcement Policies Regarding Broad. Indecency, 16 F.C.C.R. 7999, 8002 (2001)
[hereinafter Industry Guidance]; supra Part VII.A., § 1. In determining whether the
material is patently offensive, and therefore indecent, the FCC considers three principle
factors:
(1) the explicitness or graphic nature of the description or depiction of sexual or
excretory organs or activities; (2) whether the material dwells on or repeats at
length descriptions of sexual or excretory organs or activities; (3) whether the
material appears to pander or is used to titillate, or whether the material appears to
have been presented for its shock value. In assessing all of the factors, and
particularly the third factor, the overall context of the broadcast in which the
disputed material appeared is critical.
The more explicit or graphic the description or depiction, the greater the
likelihood that the material will be considered patently offensive. Merely
because the material consists of double entendre or innuendo, however, does not
preclude an indecency finding if the sexual or excretory import is unmistakable.
Industry Guidance, supra, at 8003-04. This definition and explanation of indecent
language gives the speaker ample notice of what constitutes indecent language.
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Seventh Circuit has upheld the definition of profanity used in the model
regulation. 15 2  Therefore, based on the precedent upholding the
definitions used in the model regulation, along with the recent movement
towards protecting children from inappropriate language,'53 the model
regulation places the audience on sufficient notice of what language is
prohibited.
C. The Proposed Model Regulation Will Pass First Amendment Scrutiny
as a Legitimate Means of Protecting Privacy Interests at Home
The model regulation is consistent with the captive audience doctrine
and does not violate the First Amendment. It is a valid exercise of a
state's right to protect the privacy interest of its citizens at home. As
stated in section (2) of the proposed regulation, one of its primary
purposes is to prevent children's exposure to inappropriate language via
a public television or radio broadcast. 5 4  The Supreme Court has
recognized this purpose as a legitimate protection of one's privacy
interest in the home.
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152. See Tallman v. United States, 465 F.2d 282, 286 (7th Cir. 1972). In defending this
definition of profanity, the Court concluded that "the term 'profane' was inferentially
approved" by the Supreme Court. Id. at 285 (citing Chaplinsky v. New Hampshire, 315
U.S. 568, 572-73 (1942)). The Circuit Court also refuted the petitioner's claim that the
definition was unconstitutionally vague, explaining that the Supreme Court "'has
consistently held that lack of precision is not itself offensive to the requirements of due
process"' and that "[a]ll that is required is that the language 'conveys sufficiently definite
warning as to the proscribed conduct when measured by common understanding and
practices."' Id. (quoting Roth v. United States, 354 U.S. 476, 491 (1957)). The FCC has
recently applied this definition of profanity to a professional singer's use of expletives in a
nonsexual manner during the Golden Globe Awards. See Complaints Against Various
Broad. Licensees Regarding Their Airing of the "Golden Globe Awards" Program, 19
F.C.C.R. 4975, 4981-82 (2004) [hereinafter Golden Globe Awards]; Katherine A. Fallow,
The Big Chill? Congress and the FCC Crack Down on Indecency, COMM. LAW., Spring
2004, at 1, 26. In adopting the definition of profanity as articulated in Tallman, the FCC
overturned a portion of the decision in Pacifica that interpreted the isolated or fleeting use
of the "F-Word" as not covered by 18 U.S.C. § 1464. Golden Globe Awards, supra, at
4980. Having adopted a new definition of profanity, the FCC now considers the use of
"the 'F-Word' and those words (or variants thereof) that are as highly offensive as the 'F-
Word"' between the hours of 6 a.m. and 10 p.m. (the hours children are most likely to be
in the audience) to be in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 1464, regardless of the context. Id. at
4981-82. Based on this precedent, a university can defend its definition of profanity as
putting the audience on sufficient notice.
153. See supra note 107.
154. See supra Part VII.A., § 2.
155. See Denver Area Educ. Telecomms. Consortium, Inc. v. FCC, 518 U.S. 727, 747
(1996) (plurality opinion) (recognizing a state's interest in protecting children from
inappropriate material); FCC v. Pacifica Found., 438 U.S. 726, 748 (1978) (referencing all
citizens' right to be left alone in the privacy of the home); supra note 67.
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These profane and obscene chants have a high probability of being
broadcast into the homes of those watching a game on television or
listening to a game on the radio.1 6 The Supreme Court has found that
unwilling listeners of public television and radio broadcasts are
considered a captive audience for the purpose of First Amendment
analysis.'57 While a viewer or listener is free to change the station, the
Court has found that such an explanation is equivalent to "saying that
the remedy for an assault is to run away after the first blow.',
158
In addition, the Court's concern for unnecessarily severe criminal
sanctions is not at issue in the model regulation.'59 Not only does the
proposed regulation impose no criminal penalties, the first violation of
the regulation imposes only a simple warning rather than any substantial
consequences.'6 Therefore, even if the person did not receive notice of
the regulation prior to attending a university event, he or she would have
to violate the regulation twice before being ejected. 6' Furthermore, in
contrast to the facts of Cohen,16 disapproval of offensive fan behavior at
collegiate sporting events has been well documented.'63  For these
reasons, the model regulation of fan behavior at a public university
sporting event is a valid means for a university to protect the unwilling
listeners at home.
156. See Knight, supra note 1 (noting that vulgar chants during a basketball game were
audible on a national television broadcast).
157. See Denver Area Consortium, 518 U.S. at 744 (plurality opinion); Pacifica, 438
U.S. at 748-49; Columbia Broad. Sys., Inc. v. Democratic Nat. Comm., 412 U.S. 94, 127
(1973).
158. Pacifica, 438 U.S. at 749.
159. See id. at 750 (emphasizing that the Court "ha[s] not decided that an occasional
expletive in ... this broadcast would justify a criminal prosecution"); Cohen v. California,
403 U.S. 15, 26 (1971) (explaining that "the State may not [absent a more compelling
reason] ... make the simple public display here involved of this single four-letter expletive
a criminal offense").
160. See supra Part VII.A., § 4.
161. Id.
162. See Cohen, 403 U.S. at 22 (noting that no one actually complained about Cohen's
jacket).
163. See Wasserman, supra note 3, at 377 (mentioning the incident at the University of
Maryland as "one of many incidents of offensive or obnoxious cheering by students
throughout the country during the 2004 college basketball season"); Brady, supra note 3
(quoting the Big Ten Commissioner as being "aware that the use of obscenities at games is
a big issue in certain places" and the "[n]o one feels good about it"); Knight, supra note 1
(referring to the University of Maryland as "center court in a national debate over how to
limit rowdy fans without violating free speech").
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D. The Proposed Model Regulation Will Pass First Amendment Scrutiny
as a Legitimate Means of Protecting the Unwilling Listeners Attending the
Game
The model regulation also passes First Amendment scrutiny as a
legitimate means for protecting the privacy interests of those unwilling
listeners attending the game. Section (2) of the model regulation
provides that a primary reason for the University's regulation is to
protect children attending the game from exposure to inappropriate
language. '64  The Supreme Court has recognized the protection of
children from offensive and vulgar language as a legitimate privacy
interest. 165
Additionally, children in attendance at sporting events are a captive
audience with respect to obscene and vulgar fan cheers. Similar to the
166passengers riding in a streetcar in Lehman, and the audience attending
the school speech in Fraser, the obscene message engages children who
have no means of avoiding the conduct. 16 Although an argument can be
164. See supra Part VII.A., § 2(b).
165. See Bethel Sch. Dist. No. 403 v. Fraser, 478 U.S. 675, 684 (1986). As explained in
Part V.A. of this Comment, a strong argument can be made based on Supreme Court
precedent that the Court would recognize a privacy interest at a sporting event. See supra
notes 106-16 and accompanying text.
166. See Lehman v. City of Shaker Heights, 418 U.S. 298, 306-07 (1974) (Douglas, J.,
concurring).
167. See Fraser, 478 U.S. at 684-85.
168. But see Haiman, supra note 57, at 193 (proposing that the "substantial privacy
interests are being invaded in an essentially intolerable manner" language in Cohen should
be interpreted to not allow the government to regulate "the initial impact of any kind of
communication, but that the law should protect [the unwilling listeners'] right to escape
from a continued bombardment by that communication if they wish to be free from it").
Haiman even addresses the issue of protecting children from harmful speech directly,
explaining that children are exposed to inappropriate material on a daily basis and that
exposure to the realities of a free and independent society has some beneficial effects on
the youth of society. Id. at 197-99. However, Pacifica, which was decided subsequent to
Haiman's article, takes the opposing view in protecting children from offensive language.
See FCC v. Pacifica Found., 438 U.S. 726, 749-50 (1978). The Court pointed out that
"prior warnings cannot completely protect the listener or viewer from unexpected
program content" and that "[t]o say that one may avoid further offense by turning off the
radio when he hears indecent language is like saying that the remedy for an assault is to
run away after the first blow." Id. at 748-49. While this language has led scholars to
conclude that Pacifica was decided incorrectly, the Court has yet to directly overrule the
opinion. See, e.g., Strauss, supra note 49, at 120 (concluding that the Court should not
have found the unwilling listener in Pacifica captive to the broadcast because the option to
change the radio station was readily available). However, the model regulation is still
consistent with Haiman's proposition that a speaker must violate the regulation at least
two times (thus constituting "a continued bombardment") before he or she is forced to
leave the arena. See supra Part VII.A., § 4.
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made that a spectator has the simple alternative of not attending the
game to avoid the message, this argument is without merit.' 69
Justice Brennan's concurrence in Heffron is a perfect example of why
requiring fans to leave a game is not the proper solution.170  Justice
Brennan found that attendants of a state fair were not a captive audience
because "fairgoers are fully capable of saying 'no' to [pamphleteers]
seeking their attention and then walking away.' 17' By coming to this
conclusion through analysis of the medium the speaker was using, Justice
Brennan shows that the purpose of the public venue (that is, the
entertainment of a state fair versus the necessity of public transportation
or public school) is irrelevant in determining the existence of a captive
audience. 72 If he had taken the necessity of the venue into consideration,
Justice Brennan would have concluded that attendees of a state fair can
never be considered captive because the alternative of leaving is always
available. Instead a captive audience claim should be negated only when
the unwilling listener has the option of averting his or her eyes.17 Using
this same logic, fans at a public university sporting event can be a captive
audience, depending on the means of communication used by the
speaker, even though they could avoid the offensive speech by not
attending the event.1
74
Furthermore, for the same reasons as articulated in Part VII.C of this
Comment, the statute satisfies the third, fourth, and fifth factors of the
169. See Haiman, supra note 57, at 194-95. In his interpretation of the Cohen standard
of regulating offensive speech, Haiman emphasizes "that considerations of voluntarism
with respect to the target's initial presence at the scene of communication should be regarded
as irrelevant." Id. at 194. Instead, he focuses on "the degree of voluntarism available to
[the unwilling listener] for getting out of [the unwanted communication situation]." Id. at
195. This rationale supports the proposition that an audience attending a sporting event is
captive of offensive cheers, as the only recourse available, leaving the game, results in
financial and emotional loss. In fact, Haiman uses the example of buying a ticket to attend
the theater, a situation where the viewer is spending money to voluntarily enter an
enclosed venue for entertainment purposes, as support for this proposition. Id. This
example demonstrates that Haiman's proposition is consistent with allowing a university
to regulate offensive speech on behalf of unwilling listeners.
170. Heffron v. Int'l Soc'y For Krishna Consciousness, Inc., 452 U.S. 640, 657 n.1
(1981) (Brennan, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
171. Id.
172. See id. (finding that the fairgoers were not a captive audience because they could
easily avoid the pamphlet's message rather than emphasizing the viewers' option to leave
the fair altogether); accord Cohen v. California, 403 U.S. 15, 21-22 (1971) (analyzing the
unwilling listeners' interests without mentioning the ability to leave the courthouse).
173. Cf. supra Part V.B. (emphasizing the viewer's opportunities to avoid the message
as the key factor in determining whether an audience is captive).
174. Cf Haiman, supra note 57, at 195 (concluding that the relevant question is the
unwilling listener's ability to avoid the message once exposed rather than the freedom
with which the unwilling listener entered into the communication situation).
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Cohen test. 75 Therefore, the Court would find that the model regulation
passes First Amendment scrutiny regarding the university's interest in
regulating on behalf of the privacy interests of the unwilling listeners
attending a basketball game on the university's campus.
VIII. CONCLUSION
Regulating the content of speech on a public university's campus
requires a delicate balancing of the speaker's First Amendment rights
with a university's right to maintain an orderly campus. While the
suppression of controversial content necessarily imposes an element of
censorship, it is required in certain contexts in order to protect the rights
of the unwilling listener. The regulation proposed by this Comment
attempts to sanitize a very limited part of a public university's campus: a
sports arena during a basketball game. In balancing the competing
interests, a university protects the privacy of its patrons without
unreasonably censoring others' ability to express their reaction to the
game. Considering the tradition associated with families attending
sporting events, such a regulation is necessary to preserve the excitement
and passion surrounding collegiate sports today.
175. See supra notes 160-64 and accompanying text.
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